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ASTHMA AND PESTICIDES IN PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS: DOES THE ADA PROVIDE 
A REMEDY WHERE FIFRA FAILS 
TO PROTECT? 
ANNE RAJOTrE* 
Abstract: For students suffering from asthma exacerbated or in-
duced by chemical pesticide use, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA) may provide a remedy to enjoin the use of chemical 
pesticides in public schools. The ADA has been used as a remedy 
for environmentally-related disabilities with mixed results. There 
have been successful challenges to the ADA used in this context 
based on the comprehensive regulatory nature of many environ-
mental statutes. This Note will argue that a student who suffers 
from pesticide-induced asthma is protected by the ADA. Further, 
the challenges that have precluded relief under other environ-
mental statutes would fail in this context because the scope of 
regulation of pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) is not wide enough to provide a pri-
vate right of action. Because of this, the ADA provides a remedy 
that is not in conflict with FIFRA. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1993, after treatment with the pesticides chlorpyrifos and di-
chlorvos at an Oregon school, at least sixty-five individuals, including in-
fants, children, and teachers, became sick with nausea, vomiting, severe 
headaches, dizziness, and sore throats.1 The school was forced to close. 
While it reopened after the pesticides had been cleaned up, the school 
closed early for the year when ongoing health problems were reported.2 
* Editor in Chief, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2003-04. I 
would like to thank my father, Edwin G. Rajotte, for his inspiration, assistance, and en-
couragement in writing this Note. 
I See SAFER PEST CONTROL PROJECT, PESTICIDES IN SCHOOLS: ''''HAT ARE THE HEAI~TH 
RISKS? 1, at http://www.spcpweb.org/ schheal.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2003). 
2 Sec id. 
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A misapplication of pesticides at a New York high school induced 
illness in students and faculty, forced the school to close for cleanup, 
and led to a lawsuit against the school. 3 
After an application of termiticide at a West Virginia junior high 
school, sixty-seven students, parents, and teachers filed a lawsuit against 
the school board for injuries due to exposure to the toxic pesticide.4 
Pesticides are used widely in schools to control pests in the build-
ing and on the grounds. Although pest control is necessary, the chemi-
cals used for this purpose can be harmful to humans, especially chil-
dren. Pesticide exposure can trigger asthma, the most common chronic 
illness among children. Pest control in schools is vital, however, because 
pests themselves can also trigger asthmatic reactions. This Note estab-
lishes that students suffering from asthma triggered by pesticides or 
uncontrolled pest populations may have a claim against schools under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), requiring them to provide 
effective, reduced-chemical pest control. 
Part I of this Note looks at pesticide use and its health risks, focus-
ing on how pesticides affect those who suffer from asthma. Part II dis-
cusses pesticide use in schools, including the laws that govern use, and 
Integrated Pest Management (IPM), an alternative method of control. 
Part III outlines the ADA, sovereign immunity challenges to the ADA, 
and how the ADA has been used both successfully and unsuccessfully to 
obtain a remedy for environmental problems. Finally, Part IV argues 
that a prima facie case can be made for relief under the ADA, and that 
there are alternatives to pest control available that would be considered 
a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. 
I. PESTICIDE USE 
A. Health Risks 
No pesticide is used without risk to human health; chemicals that 
are designed to kill insects and rodents present potential harm to 
humans.5 Pesticide exposure has been linked to a number of chronic 
health problems, including cancer, birth defects, endocrine disrup-
tion, asthma, neurological disorders, and Immlme system 
3 See Bd. of Educ., Eastchester Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nationwise Exterminating & 
Deodorizing, Inc., 627 N.YS.2d 768, 769 (App. Div. 1995). 
4 See Dunn v. Kanawha CountyBd. of Educ., 459 S.E.2d 151, 154 (W. Va. 1995). 
5 Valerie Watnick, Whos Minding the Schools: Toward Least Toxic Methods of Pest Control in 
Our Nation's Schools, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 73, 74 (1996). 
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deficiencies.6 Children face an even higher risk of harm because they 
are more susceptible to the dangers of pesticides.' 
Pesticides are used to control pests throughout schools, notably in 
classrooms, cafeterias, and on their grounds to maintain lawns, playing 
fields, and overall aesthetics.s Pesticide use in schools is particularly 
troubling because of the different ways that pesticides affect children 
and adults.9 Because children are physically smaller than adults and 
have higher metabolic rates, they consume more air and water per 
pound of body weight.10 As a result, if the air or water is contaminated 
with toxins, children receive a larger dose of toxins in proportion to 
their body weight than do adults who come into contact with the same 
air or water.ll This problem is compounded because children are gen-
erally lower to the ground than adults and are more likely to play on 
floors and grassy areas. Chemical particulates settle on floors and grassy 
areas, even if they were not originally applied to these places.12 
B. Asthma 
Asthma is the most common chronic illness in children, affecting 
approximately 4.8 million children in the United States under the age 
of eighteen,13 It is also an illness that is on the rise: the rate of asthma 
has more than doubled over the past century.14 Numerous scientific 
studies have linked asthma to pesticide use.15 Studies also show that 
some commonly used lawn and indoor pesticides are asthma trig-
gers. 16 Moreover, children who are regularly exposed to pesticides are 
6 SAFER PEST CONTROL PROJECT, supm note I, at 1. 
7 SeeWatnick, supmnote 5, at 77-78. 
B Sec id. at 77. 
9 See id. at 77-78; see also Phillip J. Landrigan et aI., Environmental Pollutants and Disease 
il1 A mellcan Children: Estimates of Morbidity, Mortality, and Costs for Lead Poisoning, Asthma, 
Cancel; and Developmental Disabilities, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 721, 721 (2002) (stating 
that children are more vulnerable to many chemicals than adults because of dispropor-
tionately heavy exposures coupled with the biologic sensitivity of early development). 
10 Amy Cantor & Lynn R. Goldman, Intel"1/ational Impacts of Pesticides on Children, INT'L 
J. OccuP. ENVTL. HEALTH,Jan.-Mar. 2002, at 61; Watnick, supm note 5, at 77. 
11 Watnick, supm note 5, at 77. 
12 Cantor & Goldman, supm note 10, at 61; Watnick, supm note 5, at 77. 
13 JONATHAN KAPLAN ET AL., CAL. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP CHARITABLE TRUST, 
FAILING HEALTH: PESTICIDE USE IN CALIFORNIA SCHOOLS, at V (1998). 
\4 JONATHAN KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 13, at v; Landrigan et aI., supm note 9, at 721. 
15 JONATHAN KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 13, at v. 
16 SAFER PEST CONTROL PROJECT, supm note I, at 1. 
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more likely to suffer from infectious diseases of the respiratory tract 
because of an increased risk of immune suppressionP 
Inhalation is a common way for children to come into contact 
with pesticides, which further demonstrates a pesticide's potential to 
be an asthma trigger. IS Because pesticides can move between build-
ings and throughout a room into the ambient air, they are present in 
areas other than those where they are applied.19 Eliminating pest con-
trol, however, would not relieve asthma sufferers-exposure to insects 
or rodents themselves can also trigger asthma.20 
Those suffering from asthma may react severely to the application 
of some of the most commonly used pesticides in public schools. 21 For 
example, pyrethins, which are listed on a "green list" indicating that 
they are relatively safe-as compared to a "yellow list" or a "red list"-
are most easily absorbed through ingestion or inhalation, causing 
severe reactions in people suffering from asthma.22 Organophosphates, 
which, along with carbamates, were used in all Texas schools surveyed 
in 1998, also cause severe reactions in children with asthma.23 Finally, in 
very large doses, abamectin has caused death from respiratory failure. 24 
One of the top five pesticides used in California schools is 
Cyfluthrin, which may cause irritation of the nose, throat, and upper 
respiratory tract. 25 The manufacturer of Cyfluthrin states on its label 
that "persons with a history of asthma, emphysema, or hyperactive 
airways disease may be more susceptible to exposure. "26 Considering 
that asthma-triggering pesticides such as these are used around many 
17 Watnick, supra note 5, at 80. 
18 See Denise Koch et aI., Temporal Association of Children's Pesticide Exposure and AgJicul-
tural Spraying: Report of a Longitudinal Biological Monitoring Study, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSP. 829, 832 (2002). 
19 See C.G. Wright et aI., Insecticides in the Ambient Air of Rooms Following Their Application 
for the Control of Pests, 26 BULL. ENVTL. CONTAMINATIVE TOXICOLOGY 548, 548 (1981). 
20 See Ellen F. Crain et aI., Home and Allergic Characteristics of Children with Asthma in 
Seven U.S. Urban Communities and Design of an Environmental Intervention: The Illner-City 
Asthma Study, 110 ENVTL. HEAL'lH PERSP. 939, 941-42 (2002); see also Bann C. Kang et aI., 
Experimental Asthma Developed Iry Room Ail' Contamination with Cockroach Allel'gen, III INT'L 
ARCHIVES ALLERGY & IMMUNOLOGY 299, 299 (1995) (stating that cockroach allergen is 
known to induce asthmatic reactions). 
21 JONATHAN KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 13, app. at 26; TEXAN PIN/CONSUMERS UNION, 
THE INTEGRATED PEST MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOLS 14 (1999) 
[hereinafter TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOLS]. 
22 TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 21, at 14. 
23Id. at 10, 14. 
24 Id. at 14. 
25 JONATHAN KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 13, app. at 26. 
26Id. 
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children, it is not surprising that asthma is the leading cause for 
school absenteeism.27 In 1997, pediatric asthma was the cause of 10.1 
million days of missed schoo1.28 Environmentally-related exacerbation 
is estimated to account for one third of childhood asthma cases.29 
II. PESTICIDE USE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
A. Laws Governing the Use of Pesticides 
Pesticides are designed and used to control or eliminate pests, in-
cluding insects, rodents, weeds, bacteria, or fungi.3o Pesticide use in the 
United States is controlled under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA or the Act).31 FIFRA was originally adopted in 
1947 as a licensing and labeling statute, and required that all pesticides 
be registered with the Secretary of Agriculture prior to sale into inter-
state commerce.32 FIFRA underwent changes in 1970, when the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) took over the Department of Agri-
culture's FIFRA responsibilities.33 In 1972, Congress adopted the Federal 
Environmental Pesticide Control Act, which changed FIFRA from a li-
censing and labeling statute into a comprehensive regulatory statute.34 
FIFRA, as amended, regulates the use, sale, and labeling of pesticides, 
and provides for review, cancellation, and suspension of registration; it 
also gives EPA greater enforcement authority.35 
Under FIFRA, a pesticide must be registered in accordance with 
the statute if it is to be sold or distributed.36 A pesticide may be regis-
tered for general or restricted use.37 A pesticide is labeled for general 
27 Landrigan et aI., supra note 9, at 723. 
28Id. 
29 Id. "Environmentally-related" is defined as being caused by outdoor, nonbiologic 
pollutants from sources potentially subject to abatement. Id. 
30 V.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PESTICIDES: VSE, EFFECTS, AND ALTERNATIVES TO 
PESTICIDES IN SCHOOLS 3 (1999), available at hup:/ /www.gao.gov/archive/2000/rcOOOI7. 
pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2003) [hereinafter GAO]. 
31 See generally Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 V.S.C. § 136 (2000) 
(FlFRA). 
32 See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 V.S. 597, 601 (1991); Ruckelshaus v. Mon-
santo Co., 467 V.S. 986, 991 (1984). 
33 See Ruckelshaus, 467 V.S. at 991. 
34 See id. at 991-92. 
35 See Mortie?; 501 V.S. at 601; Ruckelshaus, 467 V.S. at 991-92; see also Stephen D. 
Otero, The Case Against FIFRA Pl'I!emption: Reconciling Cipollone's Preemption Approach with Both 
the Supremacy Clause and Basic Notions oj Federalism, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 783, 785-87 
(1995) (explaining the history and regulatory area ofFIFRA). 
36 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a). 
37 Seeid. § 136a(d)(I)(A). 
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use if EPA determines that, when the pesticide is applied in accor-
dance with its directions and warnings, or in accordance with a com-
monly recognized practice, it will not "generally cause unreasonable 
adverse effects on the environment. "38 A pesticide is labeled for re-
stricted use if EPA determines that when the pesticide is used in ac-
cordance with its directions or with common practice, it "may gener-
ally cause, without additional regulatory restrictions, unreasonable 
adverse effects on the environment, including injury to the applica-
tor. "39 The statute defines "unreasonable adverse effects on the envi-
ronment" as "any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, tak-
ing into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and 
benefits of the use of any pesticide. "40 EPA uses studies of a pesticide's 
effects to make this determination.41 Some of these studies assess the 
risks to infants and children.42 
The labeling system under FIFRA does not always adequately pro-
tect children.43 Although FIFRA generally regulates the use of pesti-
cides in the United States, it does not treat application of pesticides at 
schools differently from application at other facilities, and there are 
no specific provisions in the Act about the use of pesticides in 
schools.44 Around 3,000 pesticide labels-out of over 17,000-include 
instructions or information applicable to how, when, and where the 
pesticides can be used in schools. 45 
There are several reasons why FIFRA fails to adequately protect 
children in schools.46 First, the method for labeling and licensing pes-
ticides calls for a balance between the potential environmental harm 
and the benefit of the use of the pesticide.47 The process of registra-
tion does not ensure any level of safety; chemicals that are meant to 
kill insects and rodents will present a risk to humans that come in 
contact with them. 48 Moreover, the method used to assess the risks to 
humans takes into account only the risks to adults, not the different 
38 Id. § 136a(d)(1) (B). 
39Id. § 136(d) (1) (C). 
40 Id. § 136(bb). 
41 GAO, supra note 30, at 4. 
42Id. 
43 See Watnick, supra note 5, at 86. 
44 GAO, supra note 30, at 1. 
45 Id. at 4. 
46 See Watnick, supra note 5, at 83-87. 
47 SeeFIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (2000); Watnick, supra note 5, at 84. 
48 See Watnick, supra note 5, at 85. 
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ways in which pesticides can affect children.49 Second, FIFRA's re-
quired ingredient statement calls for only the name and percentage 
of active ingredients-the ingredients that kill the pests50-accompa-
nied by a simple disclosure of the total percentage of all inert ingredi-
ents,51 not a specific listing of the inert ingredients.52 This does not 
truly show the potential harm of the pesticide because inert ingredi-
ents can be just as toxic, if not more toxic, than active ingredients.53 
Third, FIFRA does not require that those who apply pesticides receive 
even simple training with respect to the dangers of pesticides to the 
environment and human health.54 In some instances, the Act 
specifically prohibits a state from requiring a competency examina-
tion for private applicators.55 
The enforcement of FIFRA is the responsibility of EPA, which can 
assess civil or criminal penalties, or stop the sale of, seize, or destroy 
pesticides that are in violation.56 EPA may also delegate enforcement 
authority to states through cooperative agreements.57 States may fur-
ther restrict the sale or distribution of a pesticide, as long as they do 
not permit sale of a pesticide that FIFRA prohibits.58 The Supreme 
Court ruled in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier that FIFRA does 
not preempt local control of pesticides.59 Furthermore, the Court 
concluded that the statute actually tips in favor of local regulation be-
cause of its enforcement authorization to the states.60 
Although FIFRA was expanded into a regulatory scheme in 1972,61 
the statute leaves large portions of pesticide use free from regulation.62 
FIFRA does not look to establish a permit scheme for pesticide use, and 
49 See id.; discussion supra Part II.A. 
50 See 7 U.S.C. § 136(a). 
51 An inert ingredient is defined as: "an ingredient which is not active." 7 U.S.C. 
§ 136(m). 
52 Seeid. § 136(n). 
53 See Watnick, supra note 5, at 85. 
54 See 7 U.S.C. § 136i(a) (1); Watnick, supra note 5, at 86. 
55 See 7 U.S.C. § 136i(a) (1); Watnick, supra note 5, at 86. A state IIk"ly submit a plan to 
EPA if it wishes to certify applicators. 7 U .S.C. § 136i(a) (1). If a state does not have an ap-
proved plan, EPA may conduct a program for certification, and this program "shall not 
require private applicators to take any examination to establish competency in the use of 
pesticides." [d. 
56 7 U.S.C. §§ 136k, 136/. 
57 [d. § 136u. 
58 Wis. Pub. Intervenorv. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 602 (1991). 
59 See id. at 616. 
60 See id. at 608. 
61 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991 (1984). 
62 See Mortier, 501 U.S. at 613. 
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it does not assert that licensing and labeling pesticides are an approval 
to use them without regard to regional and local factors. 63 
B. Integrated Pest Management 
Integrated Pest Management (IPM) is an alternative to the tradi-
tional method of chemical pest control.64 IPM is a system of preven-
tion, monitoring, and control that is designed to choose the most 
economical and environmentally friendly method of pest contro1.65 
The primary benefits of IPM use in schools include reducing the risk 
of pesticide exposure and generally reducing the potential harm to 
children.66 IPM integrates various methods of pest control rather than 
using traditional chemical spraying.67 
The elements that make up IPM include: (1) biological control, 
or using beneficial organisms against pest organisms; (2) chemical 
control, which involves using pesticides in a responsible manner; (3) 
legal control, which is simply abiding by state and federal regulations 
that deal with pest control; and (4) cultural control, which uses meth-
ods such as sanitation and fertilization.68 When necessary, and usually 
as a last resort, target-specific, low-toxicity pesticides are applied in a 
way so that the effectiveness of pest management is maximized and 
exposure to humans and other non-target species is minimized.69 
Aside from diminishing health risks, IPM also enhances pest con-
trol in general, by providing long-term results, reducing the risk of pes-
ticide resistance, and providing a written record of pest activities and 
control actions. 70 There are, however, some barriers to implementing 
IPM: it can initially be more expensive to' put into practice; it requires 
63 See id. at 613-14. 
64 See FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136r-1 (2000). "Integrated Pest Management is a sustainable 
approach to managing pests by combining biological, cultural, physical, and chemical 
tools in a way that minimizes economic, health, and environ men tal risks." [d. 
65 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ABOUT PESTICIDES 1 (2003), at http://www.epa.gov/ 
pesticides/about/faqs.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2003); BEYOND PESTICIDES, SCHOOLS SAVE 
MONEY WITH INTEGRATED PEST MANAGEMENT 18 (2002), available at http://www.beyond 
pesticides.org/SCHOOLS/publications/IPM_cost20%]S.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2003) 
[hereinafter BEYOND PESTICIDES]. 
66 GAO, supra note 30, at 10. 
67 See Edwin G. Rajotte, From Profitability to Food Safety and the EnviTOnment: Shifting the 
Objectives of [PM, 77 PLANT DISEASE 296, 296 (1993). 
68 See id. 
69 MINN. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SCHOOL INTEGRATED PEST MANAGEMENT-WHAT Is IT? 1 
(2002), available at http://www.mda.state.mn.us/ipm/FSoverview.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 
2003). 
70 [d. 
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greater skill and knowledge than traditional pest control; there is addi-
tional paperwork; everyone at the facility, even students, must take an 
active role; and, it requires persistent attention, including the possibility 
of ongoing tr!\ining. 71 An essential component of IPM is consistently 
monitoring and inspecting for pests to determine the location and de-
gree of infestation.72 Monitoring-which involves using traps, visual 
inspections, and interviews with staff members-can be incorporated 
into other activities, such as cleaning. 73 Obtaining professional exper-
tise and training the school staff in IPM procedures comprise a large 
portion of the start-up costs. 74 Increased costs, however, are not perma-
nent; within a year or two of the IPM program, the costs drop to a level 
that is equal to or below those of traditional pest-control programs.75 
A survey of twenty-one Pennsylvania school districts that have 
adopted IPM found that the programs are effective, and of equal or 
lower cost than using hazardous pesticides; the program may even re-
duce school absenteeism.76 Most school districts surveyed were able to 
control pests with little or no chemical spraying.77 The majority of dis-
tricts reported little or no change in the cost of the pest-management 
program, and nearly a quarter reported reduced costs.78 Other examples 
of reduced costs include the Monroe County School District in Bloom-
ington, Indiana, which was spending about $34,000 per year on pest 
management before adopting IPM in 1995; by implementing IPM, the 
school district is saving $13,600 per year.79 The Montgomery County, 
Maryland public school system, which consists of 200 sites, saves $1,800 
per school each year, and $30,000 per year at its food service ware-
house.8o Furthermore, the Montgomery County School District, which 
controlled pests with 5,000 chemical applications in 1985, did not need a 
single pesticide application four years later due to IPM.81 
IPM has been encouraged and endorsed within FIFRA: the stat-




74 GAO, supra note 30, at 10. 
75Id. 
76 JONATHAN KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 13, at vi. 
77 Id. at 8. 
78Id. 
79 BEYOND PESTICIDES, supra note 65, at 19. 
MId. 
81Id. 
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and make information about it widely available.82 In addition, the 
standards for the certification of pesticide applicators include a provi-
sion to make IPM instructional materials available to applicators.83 
The Act, however, specifically prohibits state certification plans from 
requiring instruction or competence in IPM.84 
III. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
A. Establishing a Prima Facie Case Under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was enacted in 1990 
with the purpose of: (1) providing a "clear and comprehensive na-
tional mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individu-
als with disabilities"; (2) providing "clear, strong, consistent, enforce-
able standards addressing discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities"; (3) ensuring "that the Federal Government plays a cen-
tral role in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on be-
half of individuals with disabilities"; and (4) invoking the "sweep of 
congressional authority, including the power to enforce the four-
teenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address 
the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with dis-
abilities. "85 
Public schools fall under Title II of the ADA, which defines pub-
lic entity as: "(A) any State or local government; (B) any department, 
agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or 
States or local governmen t."86 A qualified individual under Title II is 
defined as an 
Id. 
82 FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136r-1 (2000). 
The Secretary of Agriculture, in cooperation with the Administrator, shall 
implement research, demonstration, and education programs to support 
adoption of Integrated Pest Management. ... The Secretary of Agriculture 
and the Administrator shall make information on Integrated Pest Manage-
ment widely available to pesticide users, including Federal agencies. Federal 
agencies shall use Integrated Pest Management techniques in carrying out 
pest management activities and shall promote Integrated Pest Management 
through procurement and regulatory policies, and other activities. 
83 Id. § 136i(c). 
84 Id. 
85 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b) (2000). 
86 Id. § 12131(1). 
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[I]ndividual with a disability who, with or without reasonable 
modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of ar-
chitectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the 
provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eli-
gibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participa-
tion in programs or activities provided by a public entity.87 
159 
To succeed on a Title II ADA claim, the plaintiff must establish: 
(1) that the plaintiff is, or represents the interests of, a "qualified in-
dividual with a disability"; (2) that such individual was either excluded 
from participation in, or denied benefits of, some public entity's serv-
ices, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against; 
and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was 
by reason of plaintiff's disability.88 
Disability is defined as a "physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [tlle] individ-
ual"; "a record of such an impairment"; or "being regarded as having 
such an impairment."89 Under the Department of Justice's regulations, 
a "physical or mental impairment" includes "any physiological disorder 
or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one 
or more of the following body systems: ... respiratory. ''90 Asthma is 
considered a physical impairment for the purposes of the ADA.91 
The ADA requires public entities to make reasonable accommo-
dations to their usual policies, practices, and procedures when neces-
sary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.92 These accom-
modations are required unless the entity can demonstrate that the 
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service.93 
The test for "reasonable accommodation" is made on a case-by-case 
basis.94 Factors in the determination include the cost of the 
modification, the budget of the program or activity, and the overall 
size and type of the program.95 
87 [d. § 12131(2). 
88 [d. § 12132; Weinrich v. L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th 
Cir. 1997); Michael S. Heyl, Note, Cil1;umventing Environmental Policy: Does the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Provide Protection Where Environmental Statutes Don't7, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH 
L. & POL'y 323, 329-30 (2001). 
89 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 
90 7 C.F.R. § 15b.3 (j) (2002). 
91 See Hunt v. St. Peter Sch., 963 F. Supp. 843, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1997). 
92 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (ii). 
93 [d. § 12182(b)(2) (A) (iii). 
94 28 C.F.R. § 42.511 (c) (2002). 
95 [d. 
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Persons with disabilities have found that Title II of the ADA may 
serve as a vehicle to extend protections of environmental and health 
laws by using the remedies of the ADA to obtain relief that would not 
be available under environmental statutes.96 Individuals who have dis-
abilities related to issues such as pesticide use or air pollution may be 
able to obtain remedies under the ADA that are beyond the scope of 
the remedies contained within the statutes that largely control these 
areas.97 Obstacles exist, however, to gaining relief under the ADA: 
there have been successful challenges to the ADA's constitutionality, 
and ADA remedies have been foreclosed by comprehensive remedial 
schemes that are contained in some environmental statutes.98 
B. The Eleventh Amendment and the ADA 
The constitutionality of the ADA has been successfully chal-
lenged, at least with respect to damage awards under Title }.99 Title I 
of the ADA makes it unlawful to engage in employment discrimina-
tion against individuals with disabilities. 1oo In Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Supreme Court held that Congress 
had not validly abrogated state sovereign immunity in enacting Title I 
of the ADA.lol Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity only 
if: (1) it states unequivocally that it intends to do so; and (2) the 
waiver constitutes a valid exercise of its authority under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.102 Congress can validly exercise this 
power under Section 5 where it is necessary to protect the Due Proc-
ess and Equal Protection rights guaranteed under Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.103 
The Court in GarTett found that Congress had not made legisla-
tive findings of a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination against 
96 See Heyl, supra note 88, at 329. 
97 See id. at 330. 
98 See discussion infra Parts III.B, III.D. 
99 Bd. of Trs. of the U niv. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001). 
100 ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2002). 
101 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374. 
102 Id. at 363--64; Seminole Tribe ofFla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996). 
\03 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364-65. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XN, § 1. 
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the disabled by the states, and as a result did not show that Title I was 
necessary to protect Due Process and Equal Protection rights; there-
fore Congress could not effectively abrogate state sovereign immunity 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.104 It further found 
that, even if there were such a pattern, there was a "congruence and 
proportionality" problem with respect to a complete waiver of sover-
eign immunity; that is, there was not congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented and the remedy adopted. l05 Al-
though the Court in Garrett found that suits to recover money dam-
ages for a state's failure to comply with Title I are barred by the Elev-
enth Amendment, it noted that this did not eliminate all federal 
remedies against discrimination.l°6 Individuals who have been dis-
criminated against on the basis of their disability may still bring suit 
for injunctive relief; Garrett only barred suits for monetary damages. 107 
The Garrett Court specifically declined to address whether the 
Eleventh Amendment bars suit under Title II of the ADA, which has 
separate and distinct remedial provisions. lOS Although there is no ques-
tion that Congress clearly stated its intent to abrogate immunity under 
Title II of the ADA, federal courts disagree as to whether there has 
been an effective waiver of state sovereign immunity under Title 11.109 
The Ninth Circuit has held that abrogation under Title II of the 
ADA was a valid exercise of Congress's power.110 In Clark v. California, 
the Ninth Circuit further held that even in the absence of abrogation 
of state sovereignty under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
Congress, states that have accepted federal funds under § 504 of the 
104 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372. 
105 See id. at 365, 372. 
106 See id. at 374 n.9. 
107 [d. 
Our holding that Congress did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immu-
nity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I does not 
mean that persons with disabilities have no federal recourse against discrimina-
tion. Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the States. Those 
standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for money damages, 
as well as by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief . ... 
[d. (emphasis added). 
108 [d. at 360 n.1. 
109 ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2000). "A State shall not be immune under the eleventh 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State Court 
of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter." Id.; see Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364; 
Patricia N. v. Lemahieu, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1248-49 (D. Haw. 2001). 
110 Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267,1270 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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Rehabilitation Actlll have waived sovereign immunity and therefore 
may be subject to suit on that basis.ll2 
Conversely, in Biggs v. BoaTd of Education, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maryland held that Congress had not 
validly abrogated sovereign immunity for Title II of the ADA.ll3 The 
court noted that "the enforcement power granted to Congress under 
Section 5 is limited to remedying violations of constitutional rights 
and may not be used to define the substance of those rights. "114 The 
court, citing GarTett, went on to say that where Section 5 legislation 
reaches "beyond the scope of § 1 's actual guarantees [it] must exhibit 
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented 
or remedied and the means adopted to that end. "115 The disabled are 
not a suspect or quasi-suspect class under the Supreme Court's equal 
protection jurisprudence.116 Because of this, the court reasoned that 
the duty to accommodate under Title II reached beyond the actual 
rights guaranteed in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. ll7 
Because the court determined that the accommodations reached 
beyond the actual rights guaranteed under Section 1, it next exam-
ined: "(i) whether 'a pattern of irrational state discrimination' in pub-
lic services against the disabled exists, ... and (ii) whether Title II is 
'appropriate' § 5 legislation. "118 Legislation is appropriate if there is a 
"congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented 
or remedied and the means adopted to that end."119 Following Gan-ett, 
the court in Biggs concluded that the legislation was not appropriate 
because the obligations imposed by Title II of the ADA went beyond 
the obligations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment; therefore, 
there was not congruence and proportionality between the targeted 
harm and means adopted to remedy the harm.120 Accordingly, the 
Biggs court found that Congress did not validly abrogate the states' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title II of the ADA, and, as a 
111 Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
was the predecessor of Title II of the ADA, and case law for section 504 is generally appli-
cable to Title II of the ADA. See Biggs v. Bd. of Educ., 229 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 n.l (D. Md. 
2002); Patricia N., 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1249 n.2. 
112 Clark, 123 F.3d at 1271. 
113 See Biggs, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 440-41. 
114Id. 
115 Id. at 442 (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001». 
116 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 V.S. 432, 442-47 (1985). 
117 Biggs, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 442. 
118Id. (quoting Garrett, 531 V.S. at 368). 
119 Id. at 443 (citing Garrett, 531 V.S. at 365). 
120Id. 
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result, the state may not be sued for monetary damages under Title 
ILI2l The court noted, however, that as in Garrett this ruling did not 
preclude a party from bringing a suit for injunctive relief.l22 
C. Asthma and the ADA 
Asthma is a condition that is considered a disability under the 
ADA.t 23 Under the definition of "disability," a physical impairment 
includes a condition which affects a person's respiratory system.124 A 
person is considered to have a disability if he has a physical impair-
ment which substantially limits one or more m,yor activities, and has a 
record of that impairment, or is regarded as having that impair-
ment. 125 Asthma is a physical impairment and Department of Justice 
regulations define a "major life activity" to include breathing.t26 
In Alvarez v. Fountainhead, Inc., the plaintiff used Title 111127 of the 
ADA to obtain a reasonable accommodation to control his asthma.128 
Title III prohibits a place of public accommodation from discriminat-
ing against an individual on the basis of disability.129 Under Title III, 
similar to Title II, "disability means, with respect to an individual, a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of 
the major life activities of such individual."13o The court found that 
the plaintiff, who suffered from asthma, was a "person with a disabil-
ity" and was entitled to the protections of Title III of the ADAPI Dis-
crimination is defined under Title III to include a denial of the op-
portunity to participate in, or benefit from, a public accommodation's 
goods and services.132 
Title III requires a public accommodation to make "reasonable 
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when such 
121Id. 
122 See id. at n.6. 
123 See Alvarez v. Fountainhead, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1051 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Hunt 
v. St. Peter Sch., 963 F. Supp. 843, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1997). 
124 See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000); Hunt, 963 F. Supp. at 850; 7 C.F.R. § 15b.3(j) 
(2002). 
125 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j) (1) (2002). 
126 See Hunt, 963 F. Supp. at 850; 7 C.F.R. § 15b.3(k). 
127 The plaintiff was a student at a private Montessori school, which falls under Title III 
of the ADA, while public schools fall under Title II. See 42 U .S.C. § 12181 (7) (k); Alvarez, 55 
F. Supp. 2d at 1051. 
128 Alvarez, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1051. 
129 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(k). 
130 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2002). 
131 Alvarez, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1051. 
132 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (1) (A) (i); Alvarez, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1051. 
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modifications are necessary" to ensure full and equal enjoyment of its 
services by individuals with disabilities. 133 Nevertheless, the reasonable 
modifications requirement is subject to limitations.134 First, 
modifications are not required where they would "fundamentally al-
ter" the nature of the public accommodation's goods and services.135 
Second, modifications are not necessary if the entity can demonstrate 
that taking such steps would result in an undue burden.136 An undue 
burden is defined as a "significant difficulty or expense. "137 In deter-
mining whether an action will be an undue burden, two factors are 
considered: (1) the cost and nature of the action; and (2) the overall 
financial situation of the site, including the number of employees, the 
effect on resources, and impact on the operation of the site.138 Third, 
an entity is not required to permit an individual to participate in or 
benefit from that entity where that individual poses a "direct threat" 
to the health or safety of others.139 
The plaintiff in Alvarez was attempting to obtain a preliminary 
injunction in order to mandate that teachers at his school administer 
his asthma medicine.140 In order for a plaintiff to obtain a preliminary 
injunction, he must demonstrate either: "(1) a combination of prob-
able success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury; or 
(2) that serious questions of law are raised and the balance of hard-
ships tips sharply in plaintiff's favor."141 The court found that requir-
ing teachers to recognize symptoms of asthma and administer medi-
cation would not fundamentally alter the program, because the 
teachers were already required to be aware of signs of health prob-
lems in students.142 Furthermore, the court found that training teach-
ers would not cause an undue burden on the school, as training 
133 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (ii); Alvarez, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1051. 
134 Alvarez, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1051. 
135 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2) (A) (iii); Alvarez, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1051. 
136 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (iii); Alvarez, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1051; see alw Randolph 
v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 858 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that a defendant may demonstrate that 
a requested accommodation would constitute an undue burden as an affirmative defense to 
an ADA claim); Hahn ex rei. Barta v. Linn County, Iowa, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1056 (N.D. 
Iowa 2001) (holding that it is the plain tiff's burden to establish that a reasonable 
modification exists; however, if such a modification exists, and the defendant shows the 
modification would fundamentally alter the requirement at issue, then the ADA does not 
require a modification). 
137 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2002). 
138 See id. 
139 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (3). 
140 See Alvarez, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1050. 
141 [d. at 1050. 
142 [d. at 1052-53. 
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would take a short amount of time.t 43 Finally, the court found that this 
accommodation would not pose a direct threat to the health and 
safety of other students if the medication was handled properly.144 
The court in Alvarez also considered the policy expressed by the 
Department of Justice's (DOJ) regulations, emphasizing that: "rea-
sonable modifications under the ADA should be 'simple and common 
sense' responses" to the needs of persons with disabilities. 145 Further-
more, the DOJ announced a policy that educators should not dis-
criminate against families of children with disabilities.146 Taking the 
type of modifications and public policy concerns into account, the 
court granted the plaintiff a preliminary injunction.147 
In addition to successfully obtaining a reasonable accommodation 
for asthma under Title III for a Montessori school, persons suffering 
from respiratory illnesses have also used the ADA to successfully obtain 
remedies outside of environmental statutes.148 In Heather K. v. City of 
Mallard, a child who suffered from severe respiratory and cardiac con-
ditions as a result of her premature birth requested a temporary re-
straining order (TRO) pursuant to Title II of the ADA.149 The plaintiff 
suffered from a condition where she could not tolerate particulates, 
such as smoke, in the air she breathed without suffering symptoms such 
as increased respiratory rate, wheezing, and severe vomiting.l50 The 
plaintiff requested a TRO to enjoin exceptions to the municipality's 
ban on open burning, which specifically allowed for backyard burning 
of residential waste and other forms of open burning. 151 
The court found that continued open burning posed a very real-
and possibly mortal-health threat to the plaintiff, satisfYing the irrepa-
rable harm element for a TRO.152 The plaintiff had no adequate rem-
edy at law, since only restraining open burning could prevent the 
threatened harm to the plaintiffs life and health; thus the irreparable 
143 [d. at 1053-54. 
144 Sec id. at 1054. 
145 [d. at 1055 (quoting Amicus Brieffor the Department of Justice at 12). 
146 See Alvarez, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1055 (citing Amicus Brief for the Department of Jus-
tice at 20). 
147 See id. at 1055. 
148 See Heather K. v. City of Mallard, 887 F. Supp. 1249, 1268 (N.D. Iowa 1995). 
149 See id. at 1251-52. 
150 See id. at 1252-53. 
151 [d. at 1251. 
152 Sec id. at 1260. The e1emen ts considered for a TRO are: (1) likelihood of success on 
the merits; (2) threat of irreparable harm; (3) balance of harms; and (4) the public inter-
est. See id. at 1256-60. 
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harm factor tipped in favor of granting a TRO.153 Considering the bal-
ance of harms, the court found that denying the injunction would pose 
a real and immediate threat to the plaintiff, while granting relief would 
harm the municipality little, if at all.154 Furthermore, her right to health 
was threatened while no similar right of the defendant was at stake by a 
ban on open burning.155 The court also noted that there was no evi-
dence that an alternative means of disposal would impose a significant 
potential economic harm upon the municipality.156 
Turning to the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits, the 
court concluded that she was a qualified individual with a disability 
under the ADA and that nothing about her disability prevented her 
from meeting the essential eligibility requirements for receipt of the 
services, programs, or activities of the city.157 In addition, the court 
found that the plaintiff's desire to use the programs, services, or ac-
tivities of the municipality would not pose a threat to the health or 
safety of others.158 Finally, the impediment was within the power of 
the municipality to eliminate; it had already undertaken to regulate 
open burning within its city limits, and therefore had the capacity to 
regulate such burning sufficiently to reasonably accommodate a per-
son with the plaintiff's disability.159 The court concluded that, for the 
purposes of a TRO, the plaintiff had established sufficient likelihood 
of success on the merits, and granted the preliminary injunction.160 
D. Foreclosure of ADA Claims by Other Federal Remedies 
Despite the plaintiff'S success in Heather K., other plaintiffs have 
not been successful in attempting to obtain an ADA remedy where a 
remedy in an environmental statute already exists.161 The main reason 
for the failure of these attempts is the conflict between remedies un-
153 See id. at 1260. 
154 Heather K., 887 F. Supp. at 1260. 
155 Id. at 1261. 
156 See id. 
157 Id. at 1261-62. In determining eligibility for use of public facilities, the only re-
quirement is that the individual be present in the city and seeking to use the public facili-
ties. See id. at 1262. 
158 See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (3) (2000); Heather K., 887 F. Supp. at 1262. 
159 See Heather K., 887 F. Supp. at 1262. 
160 See id. at 1263. 
161 See Save Our Summers v. Wash. State Dep't of Ecology, 132 F. Supp. 2d 896, 911-12 
(E.D. Wash. 1999) order denying reconsideration Sept. 14, 2000; see also Middlesex County 
Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I, 21 (1981); Heyl, supra note 88, at 
338-40. 
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der environmental statutes and remedies under the ADA.162 In Save 
Our Summers v. Washington State Department of Ecology, plaintiffs who suf-
fered from serious respiratory ailments brought suit under the ADA 
for a preliminary injunction to halt the pest management practice of 
burning wheat stubble.163 The court stated that if it had the jurisdic-
tion to hear the case, it would find that all of the elements for a pre-
liminary injunction were satisfied and a TRO would be issued; how-
ever, the court concluded that the comprehensive scheme of the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) precluded any ADA claims.164 
The court in Save Our Summers relied on a 1981 Supreme Court 
case, Middlesex County Sewerage Auth01ity v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 
which held that the Federal Pollution Control Act and the Marine 
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act did not provide a private 
right of action independent of their citizen suit provisions.165 Despite 
the fact that Sea Clammers dealt with a § 1983166 claim rather than an 
ADA claim, the court in Save Our Summers applied the same reasoning 
to an ADA claim.167 
In Sea Clammers, the Court looked at the remedial provisions of 
the statutes at issue, determining that "these Acts contain unusually 
elaborate enforcement provisions, conferring authority to sue for this 
purpose both on governmen t officials and private citizens. "168 The 
Court continued, stating: "when the remedial devices provided in a 
particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive. they may suffice to 
demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits un-
162 See Save Our Summers, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 912; see also Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 21; 
Heyl, supm note 88, at 338-40. 
ld. 
163 See Save Our Summers, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 899, 907, 908. 
164 !d. at 899. 
165 See Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 10-11. 
166 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immu-
nities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, ex-
cept that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission 
taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted 
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable 
167 Save Our Summers, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 903. 
166 Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 13. 
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der § 1983."169 The Court went on to say that it was unlikely that Con-
gress meant to preserve a § 1983 cause of action when it had already 
created specific statutory remedies, including two citizen suit provi-
sions; therefore, these statutory remedies foreclosed implied private 
actions and replaced any § 1983 remedies. 170 
Following the reasoning in Sea Clmmners, the court in Save Our 
Summers noted that the CAA also has citizen suit provisions which allow 
any person to bring a civil action against the violator, EPA, or the state 
or federal government to enforce the standards of the CAAPI It fur-
ther stated that the presence of a citizen suit provision makes it less 
likely that Congress intended to allow other private rights of action. 172 
Allowing private remedies other than what is provided for in the statute 
can be problematic because it would effectively allow a party to bypass 
the procedural requirements of the comprehensive statute, and would 
in fact nullifY the enforcement procedures crafted by Congress.173 
Although the court in Save Our Summers disposed of the plaintiffs' 
claims by concluding that they were foreclosed by the remedies in the 
CAA, it went on in dicta to explain why, if the claims had not been 
foreclosed, it would have granted a preliminary injunction.174 The 
court found that the plaintiffs satisfied the element of irreparable in-
jury because of the risk of physical injury-exacerbation of their res-
piratory illnesses-resulting from the burning of wheat stubble.175 
The court also found a likelihood of success on the merits, had the 
plaintiffs had a legal basis for bringing an ADA claim, as the plaintiffs 
met the requirements for a disability and were denied access to public 
areas because of the wheat stubble burning.176 Finally, the court found 
that the balance of hardships was in the favor of the plaintiffs: the risk 
to the plaintiffs' health was greater than the injury to wheat farmers, 
who had other means of pest control, including IPM.177 
The same court heard a motion to reconsider, and while it did not 
issue a TRO, it did change its position on the application of the hold-
ing of Sea Clammers to the case.178 Upon reconsideration, the court 
169 [d. at 20. 
170 [d. at 20-2l. 
171 See Save OUT Summers, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 901. 
172 [d. at 902. 
173 See id. at 903. 
174 See id. at 908-09. 
175 See id. at 905-06. 
176 [d. at 906-07. 
177 See Save OUT Sum1lle-rs, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 908. 
178 See id. at 910. 
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found that its previous reading of Sea Clammers had been too broad; it 
determined that Sea Clammers stood only for the proposition that § 1983 
could not be used to provide remedies outside the scope of the CAA, 
not that it prevented claims under the ADA.179 The court made the dis-
tinction that § 1983 is a "[c]ongressional 'vessel'" meant to enforce 
Fourteenth Amendment protections, while the ADA provides rights 
and remedies separate from other federal statutes. ISO Though the court 
found that plaintiffs could properly bring an ADA claim in this case, it 
also found that because of the comprehensiveness of the CAA, the only 
remedies available were those that did not infringe on subject matter 
already included in the CAA. Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to show a 
likelihood of success on the merits. 181 The court stated that plaintiffs 
were not permitted to use the ADA to obtain a result that would other-
wise only be allowed under the CAA's citizen suit provisions; if it were 
otherwise, the ADA would have "implicitly repealed the CAA with re-
gard to air pollution affecting disabled persons. "182 
IV. ANALYSIS: USING THE ADA TO REDUCE THE USE OF CHEMICAL 
PESTICIDES IN SCHOOLS WHILE MAINTAINING ADEQUATE 
MANAGEMENT OF PESTS 
The use of pesticides in school settings is a potential health risk 
to all children, but especially to those who suffer from asthma. 183 Simi-
larly, allowing pest populations to build up to intolerable levels can 
also exacerbate asthmatic conditions.184 While some schools have 
adopted safer methods of controlling pests, the majority of states do 
not require programs such as IPM, and most pest control decisions 
are left to the school districts.185 Students affected by pesticide use in a 
way that sufficiently aggravates their asthma, preventing them from 
fully participating in school activities, may have a cause of action un-
der the ADA to compel schools to reduce the use of chemical pesti-
cides, while maintaining adequate pest control.t86 The Federal Insec-
ticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) does not provide for 
this type of remedy, and its standards are not stringent enough to pro-
179 See id. at 910-11. 
180 See id. at 910. 
181 See id. at 911. 
182 See id. at 911-12. 
183 See discussion supra Parts lA., lB. 
184 See Crain et aI., supra note 20, at 941-42; Kang et aI., supra note 20, at 299. 
185 See GAO, supra note 30, at 4, 11. 
186 See discussion supra Parts lIlA, III.B. 
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tect children who suffer from asthma triggered by pests or pesti-
cides.187 The ADA is an effective alternative remedy for private citizens 
who cannot obtain relief under traditional pesticide regulation. 
A. ADA Claims Are Not Foreclosed fry FIFRA Regulation 
The difficulty in bringing ADA claims in instances where there is 
already environmental regulation poses questions about the effective-
ness of the ADA with respect to those affected by pesticides in 
schools. ISS The major barrier to stating an ADA claim for an environ-
mental issue is that some other federal environmental statutes already 
contain a remedy for private citizens.189 These types of comprehensive 
regulatory statutes have detailed remedial schemes, the most important 
being the citizen suit provisions.19o Because of the citizen suit provi-
sions, other remedies-such as ADA claims or § 1983 claims-are gen-
erally foreclosed by these built-in private remedies. 191 
Pesticides, which are governed by FIFRA, are not regulated in 
quite the same way as other environmental issues, such as air pollu-
tion and water pollution.192 The rationale for foreclosing ADA claims 
under other environmental statutes does not apply to FIFRA.193 While 
187 See FIFRA, 7 U .S.C. § 136 (2000); discussion supra Part II.A. 
188 See discussion supra Parts III.B, 111.0. 
189 See discussion supra Part 111.0. 
190 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000). The citizen suit provision of the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) reads: 
Any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf-(l) against any 
person ... who is alleged to have violated ... or to be in violation of (A) an 
emission standard or limitation ... or (B) an order issued by the Administra-
tor or State with respect to such a standard or limitation, (2) against the Ad-
ministrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform 
any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Admin-
istrator, or (3) against any person who proposes to construct or constructs any 
new or modified major emitting facility without a permit required. 
Id. Other environmental statutes that contain citizen suit provisions include: the Endan-
gered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000); the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 
(2000); the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2000); and the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9659 (2000). See Eileen Guana, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incen-
tives on the Road to Envirollmentaljustice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. I, 11 n.137 (1995). FIFRA notably 
lacks a citizen suit provision. Id. 
191 See Save Our Summers v. Wash. State Dep't of Ecology, 132 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902-03 
(E.D. Wash. 1990) order denying Tecollsideratioll Sept. 14, 2000; see also Middlesex County 
Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I, 20-21 (1981). 
192 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
193 See discussion supm Part II.A. 
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FIFRA is considered a comprehensive regulatory statute for the label-
ing, licensing, use, and sale of pesticides, it lacks the elements that 
foreclose ADA claims for other statutes, as FIFRA: (1) does not en-
compass the entire field of pesticide regulation; (2) does not pre-
scribe thorough remedial provisions for all violations; and (3) does 
not include citizen suit provisions.194 The enforcement ofFIFRA is left 
entirely to EPA, or to the states who enter an agreement with EPA, 
through civil or criminal penalties; there is no private right of action 
under this statute.195 Although EPA has regulatory authority over vir-
tually every part of pesticide manufacturing, FIFRA does not include 
remedies available to private citizens.196 Furthermore, FIFRA does not 
encompass the entire area of pesticide regulation in the way that the 
CAA and the Clean Water Act encompass the control of air and water 
pollution.197 
There is a strong emphasis on the citizen suit provisions in cases 
such as Sea Clammers and Save Our Summers because citizen suits are a 
built-in private remedy for regulatory schemes.19B In Sea Clammers, 
§ 1983 was precluded because, as its function is to enforce the protec-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment, it does not provide rights sepa-
rate from other federal statutes.199 The ADA is different from § 1983 
because it does create rights and remedies separate from other fed-
eral statutes, and therefore the court in Save Our Summers determined 
that the CAA only forecloses § 1983 claims.20o The ADA, however, 
could only be used to obtain a remedy that did not encroach on the 
subject matter of the CAA, and because the CAA is so broad, relief 
could not be obtained under the ADA.201 A remedy under the ADA 
would not encroach on the subject matter of FIFRA, which is largely 
concerned with the manufacture and labeling of pesticides.202 Rather, 
194 See FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136k, 136l (2000); Sea Cla17l17lers, 453 U.S. at 20-21; Save Our 
Summers, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 902-03. 
195 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136k, 136[, 136u; Otero, supmnote 35, at 786. 
196 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y. FIFRA does not have a specific citizen suit provision; both 
the CAA and the Clean Water Act (CWA) provide for such suits. Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 1365 (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000). 
19; See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 
(2000); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 613-14 (1991). 
198 Sec discussion mpm Part III.D. 
199 Save Our SU1mners, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 910. 
200 See id. 
WI See id. at 911. "Although the comprehensiveness of the CAA may not entirely pre-
clude Plaintiffs' suit, it does preclude Plaintiffs from obtaining relief under the ADA or the 
Rehabilitation Act that would infringe upon subject matter governed by the CAA." [d. 
202 See MortiC1; 501 U.S. at 613-14. 
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it would limit the use of pesticides at a specific site in order to ac-
commodate students who could not tolerate the chemicals.203 
The comprehensive nature of FIFRA, as compared to the CAA, 
can be distinguished not only through its remedies, but also through 
its goals.204 The CAA was designed to address the problem of air pol-
lution for the nation as a whole, and set national ambient air quality 
standards and air quality regions with the idea of maintaining an ac-
ceptable level of pollutants.205 This scheme requires consideration of 
existing pollutant levels and regional differences.206 FIFRA makes no 
such determination in regulating pesticides; it does not provide for 
permitting and does not recognize regional differences.207 Rather, it 
weighs the potential harm to human health against the benefits of 
using the pesticide to determine whether a pesticide can be sold and 
how it should be labeled.208 
The outcome of the Motion to Reconsider in Save Our Summers 
indicates that in dealing with a less comprehensive statute, especially 
one without a private remedy included, such as FIFRA, a court may 
find that an ADA claim is a potential remedy.209 An ADA claim would 
not encroach on the regulatory area of FIFRA, as it would have no 
effect on the criteria used to label and license, nor would it prevent 
the sale of pesticides approved by EPA.210 There is no regional or na-
tional consideration in licensing pesticides, so a successful ADA claim 
would not interfere with any kind of crafted regulatory scheme.211 An 
ADA claim brought to modify a school's pesticide practices would 
only affect that particular school and would not be contrary to the 
goals or regulations ofFIFRA.212 
203 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (2002). 
204 See discussion supra Part ILA.; Heyl, supra note 88, at 331-32. 
205 See Clean Air Act, 42 U .S.C. § 7407 (2000); Heyl, supra note 88, at 332. 
206 See 42 U .S.C. §§ 7408-7409; Heyl, supra note 88, at 332. 
207 See FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2000). 
208Id. § 136a(a), (bb). 
209 See Save Our Summers v. Wash. State Dep't of Ecology, 132 F. Supp. 2d 896, 911 
(E.D. Wash. 1999) order denying reconsideration Sept. 14, 2000. 
210 See 7 U .S.C. § 136; Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 613-14 (1991). 
211 See 7 U.S.C. § 136; MortiC1; 501 U.S. at 613; cf Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2000) 
(stating that a purpose of the CAA is to promote regional air pollution and control pro-
grams). 
212 See 7 U.S.C. § 136r-l; 28 C.F.R. § 42.511 (c) (2002). FIFRA includes a provision to 
promote IPM; modification of a school's pest control program to IPM is not at all contrary 
to the principles of FIFRA. 7 U.S.C. § 136r-1. Determinations of "reasonable accommoda-
tion" are made on a case-by-case basis. 28 C.F.R. § 42.511 (c). 
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B. Establishing a Prima Facie Case Under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Public schools meet the definition of "public entity" under Title n of 
the ADA.213 Under Title n, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he is, or 
represents the interests of, a qualified individual; (2) he was either ex-
cluded from or denied benefits ofa public entity's services, programs, or 
activities; and (3) the exclusion was by reason of his disability.214 An indi-
vidual with asthma clearly meets the definition of a qualified individ-
ual.215 A student who is forced to miss certain activities in school or to 
miss school entirely because of an exacerbation of his asthma is being 
excluded from a public entity's services, programs, or activities. 216 Finally, 
if a student's asthma is triggered or irritated by pesticides used on school 
grounds or by unacceptable levels of pests due to poor pest manage-
men t, the denial of services is by reason of his disability.217 
A student who is able to show that pesticide use triggers his 
asthma and results in some sort of denial of the school's services 
would be able to make out a prima facie case under the ADA.218 Once 
this is established, the public entity could be required to make rea-
sonable modification to its practices.219 Modifications are not re-
quired, however, if they would fundamentally alter the entity's serv-
ices, place an undue burden on the entity, or pose a direct threat to 
the health or safety of others.22o A modification that would diminish a 
school's ability to control pests would not be proper because it would 
be injurious to the health and safety of others.221 Additionally, a 
modification that would cost a great deal or have a great impact on 
the school's operation would also not be required.222 
There are methods of pest control, however, that can greatly re-
duce the amount of chemical pesticide use and still meet the re-
quirements for a reasonable modification, namely, Integrated Pest 
213 ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2000). 
214 Id. § 12132. 
215 Secid. § 12102(2); 7 C.F.R. § 15b.3(k); discussion supra Part III.C. 
216 See Heather K. v. City of Mallard, 887 F. Supp. 1249, 1262 (N.D. Iowa 1995). 
217 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
218 See id. §§ 12102(2),12132; Heather K., 887 F. Supp. at 1261-62; 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 
(2002); discussion supra Part III. 
219 Sec 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (ii); Alvarez v. Fountainhead, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 
1048,1051 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
220 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (iii), (b)(3); Alvarez, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1051. 
221 Sec 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3). 
222 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2002). 
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Management (IPM) .223 Aside from the overall obvious benefits, such 
as being more environmentally friendly and less dangerous to human 
health, students suffering from asthma would largely be relieved of 
chemical exposure that may trigger or exacerbate their condition.224 
Many schools that have implemented IPM have been able to control 
pests with little or no chemical spraying.225 
IPM would likely be considered a reasonable modification under 
the ADA,226 First, IPM would not fundamentally alter the nature of the 
school's services.227 Schools already engage in some sort of pest control 
as part of the maintenance of their grounds and buildings, and IPM 
would only be a change in the method of pest contro1.228 Second, im-
plementing IPM would not be an undue burden to schools.229 Putting 
IPM into practice at schools may involve increased expense at the begin-
ning, such as staff training costs and obtaining professional expertise.230 
School districts that have implemented IPM, however, have reported 
lessened costs after just a year or two of the program.231 Since any 
modification will put some sort of burden on an entity, a year or two of 
increased costs and training will likely not be considered "undue. "232 
Third, IPM will not pose a direct threat to the health and safety of oth-
ers.233 On the whole, it will decrease the school population's exposure to 
chemicals and help prevent incidents of chemical poisoning.234 
Implementing IPM as a remedy for an ADA violation does not vio-
late any provisions of or policies driving FIFRA.235 In fact, FIFRA recog-
nizes IPM and mandates EPA's research and support of this method.236 
The overall reduction of chemical pesticide use at schools would be a 
223 Discussion supra Parts III.A, III.C; see 42 U .S.C. § 12182(b)(2) (A) (iii), (b) (3); Alva-
rez, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1051. 
224 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
225 JONATHAN KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 8. 
226 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (iii), (b) (3); Alvarez, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1051. 
227 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2) (A) (iii); AlvaT/!z, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1052-53. 
228 See Alvarez, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1052-53. Teachers were already required to recognize 
health problems in students and recognizing asthma symptoms in a particular student 
would not fundamentally alter the program. [d. 
229 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (2)(A) (iii); GAO, supra note 30, at 10; JONATHAN KAPLAN 
ET AL., supra note 13, at 8. 
230 GAO, supra note 30, at 10. 
231 See id.;JONATHAN KAPLAN ET AL., Sltpra note 13, at 8. 
232 See Alvarez, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (stating that requiring teachers to have a one 
hour training on the use of an asthma inhaler would not pose an undue burden). 
233 See 42 U .S.C. § 12182(b) (3); discussion supra Part II.B. 
234 See discussion sttpra Part II.B. 
235 SeeFIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136r-1 (2000). 
236 See id. 
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benefit for all students because it would lower the risk of chemical poi-
soning and other potential health problems.237 For those who suffer 
from asthma triggered by pesticides, the need to reduce chemicals is a 
pressing one because, essentially, pesticides are preventing these students 
from fully participating in schooI.238 The ADA is an effective way to 
quickly reduce the amount of chemical pesticides used because it re-
quires schools to make a reasonable accommodation for individuals with 
disabilities.239 Some states have already passed legislation requiring IPM 
at schools, but for those that have not, or have made IPM only voluntary, 
the ADA is an individualized response to this problem. 240 
CONCLUSION 
For a child suffering from asthma triggered by pesticides or in-
sect allergens, the ADA could be a very effective method to reduce 
the amoun t of chemical pesticides used in schools, while still effec-
tively controlling pests. FIFRA does not provide an adequate remedy 
for a private citizen, and its standards are not stringent enough to 
protect those who are more susceptible to adverse reactions to pesti-
cides. IPM at schools-already mandatory in some states-is an ideal 
solution for schools with students who cannot tolerate chemical pest 
control. In addition, reducing the use of chemicals is beneficial to all 
the children in the school, not only minimizing the risk of chemical 
poisoning. but also taking steps to avoid some of the long-term health 
risks linked with pesticides, such as cancer. 
A student who suffers from pesticide-induced asthma would likely 
be able to establish a claim under the ADA so that he or she can attend 
school without worry of an asthma attack. Furthermore, reduction in 
asthma attacks would increase the school attendance rate, and prevent 
what is essentially the denial of a vital public service-education. 
m SeeWatnick, supm note 5, at 77-79. 
238 See Landrigan et aI., supm note 9, at 723. 
239 See discussion snpm Part lILA. 
240 See GAO, supm note 30, at 8; discussion supm Part III.A. 

